ABSTRACT. This article considers a particular moment in world history when an instant of epochmaking triumph in the non
Hamish Ion have recognized. 30 The tendency observable during the early days of the Russo-Japanese
War to attribute the character of Japanese troops to Prussian influence 31 soon faded as Nitobe's idea of Japanese patriotism as a feudal legacy of the samurai (bushido literally meaning 'the way of the warrior') was given additional publicity through committed champions in Britain. 32 Accordingly, in discussing the need to evolve a 'system of national ethics', the Coefficients equated bushido with 'the patriotism of the whole nation', asserting that 'Bushido' now needed to be 'engrafted… on English public spirit'. 33 Another notable admirer was Robert Baden-Powell, the founder of the Boy Scouts
Movement, who identified his scheme as an attempt to do for Britain what 'Bushido… has done, and is still doing, for Japan'. 34 The scheme won the approval of H. G. Wells who famously called the ruling-elite of his Modern utopia (1905) the 'Samurai'. 35 Such emulative attitudes towards bushido in fact mark an ironic instance of 'reciprocal learning'; that Nitobe's concept was an 'invented tradition' has been well-noted by his Japanese contemporaries and later scholars alike, 36 but, more revealingly, a recent work has highlighted the influence of contemporary English ideals of chivalry and the 'gentleman' on the nascent development of the concept in Meiji Japan. 37 In advocating an appropriation of bushido, the British were striving for an unconscious re-importation of what had long been an 'English tradition'.
Less appreciated in the extant literature, however, is the extent to which such apparent fascination with bushido was underpinned by a more critical reading, and in fact a reconceptualisation in Britain, of Nitobe's original contention. 38 It is well-known that an eminent British Japanologist like Basil Hall Chamberlain dismissed bushido as a 'fabric of ideas', but such critical attitudes towards the historical validity of the concept were in fact prevalent earlier, and amongst larger sections of British society. 39 As early as 1905, the Saturday Review pointed out that Europeans who could remember the samurai at the time of the revolution in 1868 recalled 'not the chivalrous, brave, frugal, courteous, loyal, patriotic, self-sacrificing knights', but 'a class of roistering bullies':
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'Bushido was never once appealed to as a national incentive by the great leaders of Japan until her reformation was complete'. 40 Less acerbically but no less inaccurately, Ian Hamilton, the senior military attaché in Manchuria, who had been given a copy of Bushido as a present from the Japanese army, identified the samurai as 'already men of yesterday'. 41 A more dominant explanation in Britain for the roots of Japanese patriotism instead stressed the effectiveness of Japan's new educational system. A particular emphasis was laid on moral teaching in schools -the cultivation of 'a feeling of moral obligation' to the Emperor -'splendid results' of which were now seen to be manifest in the war. 42 The origin of such development was explicitly located in 1890 -the year of the Imperial Rescript on Education. 43 Such were also the conclusions reached by the War Office, following their newly-organized visit to Japan in 1906. Demonstrating the seriousness of the interest in Japan, the two-month expedition officially aimed to 'study locally the system and methods of Japanese military education', having seen 'what the Japanese can do in war'. 44 The delegation, which surveyed Japanese primary and middle schools as well as military preparatory schools, concluded in their subsequent report that the 'efficiency' of the Japanese soldier was 'due less to his natural characteristics than to the education which he receives in his youth'. 45 They identified in Japan's high conception of patriotic duty ('no parallel among nations of the world'), not so much a feudal legacy of the samurai as a product of the 'progressive programme of ethical instruction' based on the 1890 Rescript on Education; the displays of 'heroism' during the recent war amounted to a 'practical realization' of what would have otherwise seemed 'Utopian'. 46 The eulogistic tone of the report was most probably sincere; in a private letter to Leo Amery, the author of the report, Colonel A. M. Murray who led the delegation, wrote from Tokyo: 'for discipline and endurance our men are not in the same boat with the Japanese'; 'I am convinced of the superiority of their system over our public school system for making officers for modern war purposes'. 47 An increasingly common line of thinking in Britain thus held that patriotism in modernised Japan had been taught in schools, and this was where Britain, by comparison, lagged behind. Having cited the example of Japan, the prominent geographer Thomas Holdich asked: 'Do we take the least trouble to inculcate the principles of patriotism ab initio in our elementary schools, either in England or in India?' 48 'Bushido' -as a term to denote the self-sacrificing patriotism of the contemporary Japanese 'some kind of imitation of Bushido in our schools' was now desirable. 49 Such use of the term differs markedly from the original conception by Nitobe who had been keen to insist that 'moral precepts' learnt in childhood had not been given in schools, but instead rooted in bushido, and had similarly denied as 'less than half truths' the idea that Japan's victory over China had been the 'work of a modern school system'.
50
Such re-conceptualisation of bushido needs to be contextualized within Britain's broader preoccupation at that time of the use of education as a means to strengthen national consciousness. As noted earlier, late Victorian and Edwardian imperialists saw the need to improve national cohesion, one manifestation of which was a nationalising campaign in schools. The Conservative government in 1902 reclaimed control of education from the local school boards and sought to impose a stronger national curriculum with a greater emphasis on citizenship, patriotism, and history, which had long been neglected. 51 However, such a change in policy was slow to bear fruit. Flags and maps were lacking until the First World War, compulsory history lessons added up to no more than a dozen a year and, more fundamentally, there was a prevailing diffidence about direct inculcation. 52 It was in the face of such unsatisfactory progress at home that critics found in their adapted bushido an ideal and foil against which to re-assert the importance of teaching patriotism.
A more radical manifestation of the preoccupation with national cohesion was the campaign for national service, led by the National Service League, founded in 1902. Unsurprisingly, for George F.
Shee, its founder, the Japanese provided a useful counter-point for highlighting Britain's need for a lesson in 'self-subordination': whereas the Japanese, with their solidarity of purpose, were 'one', he argued, the British -'devoted to the idea of absolute individual liberty' -lacked the unity vital for imperial survival. 53 More surprisingly, even for the scientifically-minded proponents of efficiency, the seemingly conservative notions of 'spirit' and 'national cohesion' proved compatible with their technocratic language of 'scientific organisation'. As part of a similar series of articles on Japan's What underlay all of these positive appraisals of Japan was a shared recognition of a certain fundamental difference between the British and the Japanese. As Dyer remarked, the Japanese mind was dominated 'to a great extent by collective opinion', unlike the British, which was 'strongly individualistic'. 55 After all, what had allowed the Japanese to succeed, both on the battlefield and in their 'domestic revolution', was their prioritisation of 'collective duty'. 56 From such a viewpoint, it was now possible for The Times to propose: 'this doctrine of devotion to the good of others… may well prove a useful corrective to the excessive individualism into which Western civilization sometimes shows a tendency to degenerate', a point iterated by the War Office delegation to Japanese schools. 57 This dichotomy between Japanese self-subordination and British individualism was most acutely perceived by advocates of national service. In the words of the journalist and Coefficient member J. L. Garvin, the Japanese (and Germans) were 'trained to die for their country' whilst 'we, more than any other people -except the Americans -are taught to live for ourselves'. 58 In its fundamentals, this dichotomy was recognized as a question of rights versus duty. As Lord Roberts, the President of the NSL lamented, it was 'painful' to 'hear Englishmen talk… so much of their rights and so very little of their duties'. 59 Although no supporter of compulsory service, for Ian Hamilton too, the greatest lesson afforded by Japan was 'the idea that the public interest comes first and the private interest comes a long way second'; 'What is right compared with duty?' 60 Such eulogizing about Japan did not please everyone. Critical reactions to the so-called 'cult of Japan' were mostly found in publications associated with the radical wing of Liberalism, such as the The Speaker, which was opposed less to Japan than to the concept of 'efficiency' as a whole, regarding it as a threat to the traditional liberal values of popular control and individual rights. 61 Other criticisms involving Japan tended to be made as part of a broader disapproval of Britain copying other nations. One commentator, for example, argued that in view of the differences in historical trajectories, Times neatly encapsulated, if the Japanese had 'learned much from the West', the Japanese had 'set… in return an example of high endeavour… which [the British] may well study'. 64 In their fundamentals, the critical self-reflections on Britain's status quo were underpinned by a widely recognized contrast between Western individualism and Japanese self-ordination, a comparison which, contrary to the Saidian framework, involved not a disparagement of an Oriental 'Other' or even an idealisation of an 'Old' Japanese 'tradition', but rather an appreciation of a 'New' reformed Japan now in certain respects deemed more 'modern' than Britain.
III.
At a simple level, given the context in which reform debates took place in post-South-African War
Britain -coinciding as they did with Japan's spectacular performance against Russia -it is easy to see that an emulative discourse on Japan found resonance amongst proponents of efficiency. Given also the growing rivalry with Germany -the other archetype of efficiency -during this period, it is not inconceivable that Japan, as Britain's ally following the alliance of 1902, proved the more politically convenient referent. Yet at a more fundamental level, these discourses of emulation present a certain paradox: the vast majority of such proponents were imperialists, whose commitment to empire, as far removed from the mid-Victorian universalist vision of a colour-blind empire. 66 There were analogous intellectual reconfigurations within the scientific world, including not only a greater dissemination of scientific racism of the racial typologies kind from the 1880s onwards under the influence of Francis Galton (president of the Anthropological Institute, 1885-9), 67 but also importantly, the growth of racial perspectives rooted more broadly in 'scientific naturalism' that viewed human beings as natural objects subject to natural laws, interpreting the decline and even the extermination of aborigines under European imperialism as a natural process, devoid of moral responsibility or human agency. 68 Transformations in the broader institutional context including the professionalisation of science, expansion of state education, and increased production of science textbooks facilitated the dissemination of such scientific worldviews. 69 The net outcome of these manifold late-nineteenth century developments, according to Lorimer, was the supersedure of the 'assimilating' vision of Victorian values by the 'exclusionary' language of 'white virtues' as the dominant (though not sole) discourse, as British civilisational assets -once enshrined as a universal creed -came to be re-established as the exclusive property of white people. 70 Viewed in these contexts, British attempts, illustrated in Bill Schwartz' recent study, to resolve the intellectual dilemma presented by the South African War -that the principal enemy was white -are emblematic of what may be summed up as the burgeoning 'exclusionary "civilisational perspective"': the Afrikaners, the British typically claimed, were 'less civilised, or less white', than themselves. 71 It was this late Victorian and Edwardian vision of the 'white man's world' that came under challenge with the Japanese victory of 1905. As The Times editorial recognized, the defeat of a European monarchy by 'a nation of unmixed Asiatic blood' marked an event of 'the very highest importance' to the 'whole human race'. 72 The 'triumph of Japan', the Review of the Reviews remarked, sounded 'the death knell of the ascendancy of the white race'. 73 This new reality was to be reconciled by revising the exclusive synonymity of 'civilisation' with 'whiteness'. As one critic reflected, 'the era of inequality between the races is over. Henceforth white and yellow man must meet on equal
footing. Yet one thing is certain -that the victory of civilisation is assured'; whereas the Japanese had proved themselves 'true friends and honourable foes', boasted honest statesmen, and obeyed 'laws Page 13 of 32
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which the West recognises', it was the Russians who had 'fallen behind in the race of progress'. 74 Japan, echoed The Times, had been 'fighting in the common cause of all civilized nations'. 75 In discussing the rise of Japan in terms of 'civilisation', a number of commentators also dwelt on Japan's domestic transformation. The Japanese, according to The Times, had 'mastered the ways of Western civilization with extraordinary completeness'. 76 Aside from the manifest progress in material terms, Japan's socio-political organization received special mention. In the words of the Liberal political economist Leonard Courtney, Japan, in breaking away from feudalism, had 'set up a parliament of the most approved fashion' following a 'careful examination of the latest teaching of the Western world'. 77 Expressed in the language of the time, civilisational capacity for organization could be explicitly linked to 'efficiency'; the Coefficients maintained that the 'real test of civilization' was 'general efficiency and power of organization and of providing for the future, whether economic or military'. 78 Japan's military success against Russia thus came as the ultimate attestation of her 'civilised' status -a view apparently widespread enough to prompt cynical reflections on the irony of the fact that in 'Christian civilisation… the decisive test of full-growth has been one of war and death', and the ruling deity 'Mars -the heathen God of War'.
79
The exclusionary civilisational perspective of the previous decades was now recognisably untenable. As the liberal sociologist L. T. Hobhouse observed, the rise of Japan as a 'modern power' came as a repudiation of earlier beliefs that 'the characteristics of European civilisation were a monopoly of race'. 80 For Benjamin Kidd, Japan 'literally fulfilled' his prediction in Social evolution (1894) that 'sooner or later, it would be become clear… that the Western peoples in basing a claim to supremacy on the assumption that they possessed any inborn intellectual or other mental superiority over the less advanced races of men, were building on a false hope'. 81 In his introduction to the 1908 edition of Principles of Western civilisation, Kidd asserted more clearly than ever: 'civilisation is not a matter of race, nor descent, nor superior intellectual capacity but of ethos'.
82
Not only did the rise of Japan reaffirm the mid-Victorian 'civilisational perspective' on social evolution and its applicability to non-whites, but also raised the possibility that a successful civilisation most equipped to win the 'struggle for existence' might not even necessarily be Western.
As outlined in the previous section, in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War the British lavished much Indeed, if the Japanese demonstration of a capacity to rise to modernity and power had the effect of reinvigorating a less racially exclusionary civilisational perspective, Japan also profoundly challenged existing British conceptions of the very nature of 'civilisation'. For example, for all his later insistence on his prescience, the immediate aim of Benjamin Kidd in writing Social evolution (1894) had been to explain how the West had achieved their superior place in the scale of development, with his answer being social efficiency derived from Christianity. 84 As evident from his prediction that Western arts and sciences might be acquired by the non-West, 'civilisation' in this context denoted a specifically Western civilisation. Yet, in reality, for all its debt to Western civilisation, the new 'civilisation' exemplified by the Japanese diverged in important ways from the European model: not only had Japan exhibited non-Western uniqueness on its path to civilisation with its remarkable displays of discipline and self-subordination but, more perturbingly, this was a path that had not passed through Christianity.
The outcome of the Russo-Japanese War -the defeat of a Western, Christian power by a nonWestern, so-called 'heathen' power -was widely taken as a major intellectual challenge to the ageold belief in the relationship between Christianity and civilisation. Any nation that had stood the 'supreme test' of war was not to be easily dismissed as 'wanting in… moral and intellectual greatness'. 85 As the prominent jurist John Macdonell recognized, the 'rise of Japan' and the
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'enfeebling of Russia' might mean 'an end… of the Christian hegemony of the world'. 86 The Japanese success, Beatrice Webb speculated, would 'alter not merely the balance of power, but the balance of ideas -it will tell against Christianity as the one religion'. 87 Later, in an article subsequently acclaimed as 'remarkable' and voicing 'the feeling that has been growing in the minds of many thousands', 88 the editor of the non-sectarian Hibbert Journal candidly admitted:
Christendom, as a whole, long accustomed to treat all pagan races as morally inferior to herself, now stands confronted by a non-Christian civilisation… whose claim to moral equality, at least, cannot be disregarded, except by those who are morally blind. Through the rise of Japan a fresh term of comparison has come into existence in the presence of which the self-estimates of all Christian nations and of Christianity itself will have to be revised.
89
For a number of commentators, the conduct of the Japanese during the Russo-Japanese War provided unmistakable evidence of such moral efficacy. Commending the Japanese on the 'touches of humanity and sympathy' with which they tended their wounded adversaries, and refrained from any subterfuges, John Macdonell frankly avowed: 'a non-Christian State has set an example to Christian nations… on the lines of civilisation. The superior prestige of the West for humanity is gone'. 90 In a similar vein, the development of the Red Cross Society in Japan garnered praise in the Contemporary Review. The Society's commitment to impartial treatment of wounded soldiers was taken to prove that the 'feeling of human pity' was 'at least as strong and as widely diffused in non-Christian Japan as… in any Western and Christian country'. 91 Such activities, the writer propounded, should instead be taken to dispel the mistaken assertion that Japan's progress had been confined to material progress and that the Japanese remained 'barbarians at heart'. 92 The roots of such moral characteristics were rarely identified as creedless. Instead, many sought to identify the influence of religious or quasi-religious beliefs other than Christianity to explain the dissonance of non-Christian moral excellence. In the case of the Red Cross Society, the ideological roots underpinning the concept were recognized as Confucian, and explicitly not as Christian, such that the society in Japan did not constitute 'merely a copy' of the European model, but was seen to
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reflect 'the peculiar moral, social and religious ideas… prevailing in Japan'. 93 Others, such as The Times, associated the 'noblest qualities' of the Japanese with Buddhism. 94 Likewise, for the editor of the Hibbert Journal, the qualities displayed by the Japanese reflected a 'spirit of Buddhism', which, by comparison, stimulated a critical take on the current state of Christianity, which was seen to be tainted by an 'astounding divorce' between 'ideas' and 'normal practice' resulting in a demoralisation manifested among the 'idle rich' and 'drunken thousands of Glasgow, Liverpool, Birmingham, or the East End'.
95
Even in the case of concepts unfamiliar to the West, an emphatically sympathetic attitude was taken: 'When a Japanese reverently refers to the benign spirits of his ancestors, the expression may sound strange to us… But we must not be so dull as to miss the truth that in this form the Japanese… do homage to the same unseen Power whom we in other forms of speech endeavour to approach'. 96 The close relationship now being established between the state, religion and loyalty also received some notice. Acknowledging that the 'politico-religious element' in Japan tended to be 'antiChristian', Archibald Colquhoun (former Administrator of Southern Rhodesia) observed that patriotism, taken in the Japanese sense (and explicitly not 'in the Western sense'), possessed the 'essentials of any true religion': the recognition of supreme power, the practice of certain rites, and conformity with rules of life. 97 Meanwhile, Japan's allegedly low commercial morality, which had long been a source of British resentment, came to be emphatically treated as an unrepresentative exception. 98 The combined result of such lines of thinking was an atmosphere in which, in the words of a contemporary writer, 'it was not uncommon for a man to be considered a scarecrow of bigotry and obscurantism because he distrusted the Japanese, or lamented the rise of the Japanese, on the ground that the Japanese were Pagans'. 99 There is a certain consistency in the nature of these discussions on the moral-religious dimension of Japan. Not unlike Nitobe's own motivation in writing Bushido, the soul of Japan, far from disparaging the Japanese as 'heathen' on account of being non-Christian, these British writers insisted on identifying some kind of an alternative creed to Christianity through which to explain the Japanese moral conduct. In so doing, commentators were anxious to make explicit the negligible influence of Christianity in Japan; no longer to lament its absence, but rather to give respectful recognition to
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certain fundamental differences between Japan and the West, and even to praise Japan's displays of 'non-Westerness' in place of uncritical imitation. Such observations closely parallel the series of emulative discourses on Japanese patriotism, bushido in schools, or collective spirit, all of which stressed Japan's particularity rather than its successful Westernisation. Japan's victory against such a great European power as Russia on the back of a remarkable domestic transformation, combined with the undeniable displays of moral efficacy in their war-time conduct, meant that Japan now had to be fully recognized as 'civilised'. As expressed most clearly by The Times, Japan, 'judged by every standard of modern civilization and by every principle which underlies our professions of Christianity'
had, 'in peace and in war… stood triumphantly the most severe tests by which the highest qualities of a great nation can be tried'. 100 Yet the 'civilisation' exhibited by Japan was not to be treated as synonymous with Western Christian civilisation. The dissonance of a 'heathen' civilisation was to be reconciled through acceptance that the newly arisen civilisation was different from, yet still consistent with, Western standards of civilisation. The idea of 'civilisation', in short, now rested upon a more plural perspective.
Such understanding of 'civilisation' signifies an important divergence from the old Christian, or Enlightenment universalist conception of civilisation that had presumed a high level of fundamental commonality among all humans, underpinned by theories of monogenesis. The revised understanding of civilisation allowed for dissimilarity, amongst which existed religious and cultural diversity, as well as differences in skin colour. As outlined above, the racially exclusionary perspective on the Japanese as an irredeemably inferior race of Orientals was rendered obsolete by their demonstrable capacity to shoot up the ladder of civilisation, but in British eyes, they remained both non-Western and non-white -hence Britain's recognition of the epoch-making significance of the Japanese victory over Russia. In all this, the British contrasted sharply with the Americans who, in Joseph Henning's study, are shown to have come to terms with the rise of Japan by arguing that the Japanese were not 'Asiatic' but in fact (ethnologically or adoptively) 'Aryans', seeking thus to maintain their belief in the supremacy of the white Anglo-Saxon race. 101 In Britain, the idea that there were profound differences between the West and Japan was not merely compatible with, but rather an integral part of, the new civilisational outlook. It is this twin
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recognition of Japanese civilisation and particularity that also explains the unhesitating manner in which Edwardians sought inspiration from the Japanese in their quest for efficiency. As The Times recognized upon the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, from difference arose mutual lessons:
The rise of a nation whose civilization contains many elements which differ profoundly from those that go to make up the civilization of the West must exercise a new and powerful influence on the mind of the West… a constructive influence… Japan will doubtless be affected by growing intercourse with the West, as the West will inevitably be affected by her. Each will learn, and must learn, from the other good and evil. 102 Members of the Coefficient Club also encapsulated something of this sentiment in their discussion on the future development of civilisation. Referring to Japan as an example of a nation that had 'taken European or general civilization' but 'kept its own culture', the participants recognized that alongside the more universal function of civilisation as 'the organisation of life for the better satisfaction of the ordinary human needs', there was also a cultural dimension to civilisation, which was 'peculiar to some particular people or some particular time'. 103 The plurality underpinning their vision is evidenced by their conclusion: 'every race has its own merits, and can contribute something towards a common civilisation'. 104 Such a conception of civilisation was explicitly acknowledged to differ both from the 'old racial view', which rested on 'biological evolutionary theory', and also from the 'Christian, positivist, or liberal view', which ignored 'all racial differences', and considered 'men as not only equal but similar': 'that men are not equal and similar', the Coefficients asserted, 'is obvious'. 105 Tellingly, what was now in question was not how far Western civilisation would spread, but instead how far, in view of the culturally particularistic dimension of civilisation, 'a common world community' with a 'common culture' would gradually emerge.
106
IV.
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What remained open to debate in Edwardian Britain was the extent to which the achievements of Japan represented an exception amongst 'Asiatics', or was instead the beginning of a broader trend towards an 'Eastern awakening'. One response, common during and immediately after the RussoJapanese War, was to insist upon the uniqueness of the Japanese case. 'Irreconcilable differences' and 'gulfs' were identified between Japan's patriotic and progressive character and China's apparent lethargy and contempt for Western civilisation. 107 Such unfavourable comparisons often formed part of widespread counterarguments in Britain to dispel the idea of a 'yellow peril' more strongly pronounced in the continental press -that the rise of Japan would be followed by the rise of a hostile East, and culminate in a joint crusade against Western civilisation. 108 Such 'hasty generalizations',
The Times remarked, 'seem to us unfounded'. 109 The Spectator epitomized the dominant view of the day when they observed in May 1904 that the Japanese, in their extraordinary degree of patriotism and organization, were 'no more Asiatic than they are European'. 110 However, such positive insistence on Japanese exceptionalism became increasingly untenable in light of unfolding developments in Asia and the emergent wider implications of Japanese success for the British empire. 111 Politicians in the House of Commons repeatedly referred to growing signs of unrest in the East, especially in India, while in regard to China, many writers were forced to revise their previous views on Chinese apathy as they began to observe a 'new spirit 'and an 'awakening' on account of its growing nationalism. Accompanying these widespread observations was an undisputed recognition that the stimulus behind this new Asian confidence was Japan's recent triumph over a white, European power; much as the British might insist on the uniqueness of the Japanese case, it was becoming clear that those in the Orient identified an affinity with the Japanese, and thus viewed such modernisation and rise to power as imitable. 112 The rush of Chinese and Indian students to Tokyo after 1905 was seen to provide confirmation of this new reality.
113
These developments had the effect of dispelling some of the earlier scepticism towards the 'yellow peril'. For one critic, they represented a disturbing realization of Charles Pearson's controversial thesis on the inevitable decline and fall of white civilisation. 114 Although few other writers went as far as this, E. J. Dillon, a prominent journalist who had previously dismissed the 'yellow peril' as a 'meaningless' cry and magnanimously welcomed the rise of Japan on the grounds 116 The capacity and zeal for progress that had aroused euphoric appraisals about 'efficiency' when considered particular to Japan instead generated anxiety when deemed no longer unique but widespread across Asia. As Dillon recognized, 'the Japs or the Hindoos -are by no means inferior peoples… That is the essence of the matter'. 117 As the decade progressed, Japan's own behaviour in the Far East also fed into this sense of anxiety. Enthusiasm was increasingly replaced by critical re-assessment to the point where The
Spectator noted in 1908, 'the cold fit has noticeably arrived'. 118 Reflecting widespread disenchantment, The Times observed that in Korea as in Manchuria, the Japanese, 'though claiming to appear as liberators… behaved too often as heavy-handed conquerors'. 119 Although the resultant disunity of Asia -arising from Chinese and Korean alienation from Japan -could be used to reinvigorate repudiations of the 'yellow peril' by denying the possibility of a united military front against the West, Japan's expansionist ambition remained a cause for concern. 120 In this regard, Shigenobu Okuma's speech in 1907 on Japan's duty to 'protect' India from 'European oppression', although generally regarded as unrepresentative of the official Japanese viewpoint, did little to quell anxieties. 121 Another major source of tension towards the end of the Edwardian decade was the issue of Japanese immigration to the British dominions. As the journalist Lancelot Lawton recognized, the situation was 'complicated to an extraordinary degree' by the fact that while Japan was Britain's 'friend and ally', the presence of her people was 'resented by the Colonies more than the presence of the people of any other Asiatic race'. 122 For some British, reflecting their recognition of Japanese capacity, the crux of the issue was seen to be Japanese 'virtue' rather than 'vice': 'at the bottom of the whole affair', The Times remarked, 'is economic jealousy… the real objection to the Oriental is that he is too frugal, too industrious, and too efficient'. 123 For others, the issue awoke in them the uncomfortable reality that recognition of the validity of Japanese civilisation, founded on an Can they honestly say that they would like to live… with men and women of the yellow race… called upon almost daily to choose whether they would conform to the moral, intellectual, and social standards set by Asia … or those set by Europe? We do not wish to argue here whether the European standards are necessarily better, and we are fully aware that a Japanese may often put to shame a European in matters of morality, temperance, and self-restraint. The fact remains, however, that the moral and social and political ideals are different. 124 The specific implications of the issue for Japan were acutely recognized in Britain: 'Asiatics previously seemed to be excluded because of their temporary backwardness in civilisation. But now they have proved, as the educated among them think, their potential equality. Still being refused the privilege of free settlement… they realise at last that Asiatics are shut out of the other Continents because they are Asiatics; and that nothing but force seems likely to reverse that state of things'. 125 In replacing the former intellectual dialectic between civilisational universalism and racial supremacism, a new, even thornier tension thus emerged between 'civilisation' and 'race' that was to reach its apex in 1919 with Japan's controversial and ultimately unsuccessful demand for racial equality at the Paris Peace Conference. It has hitherto been the tacit assumption of the white races of mankind that the world belongs to them… that civilization can only mean their civilization, and religion only their religion… There are now, however, many indications that his assumption can no longer pass unchallenged. There are qualities in some of these non-white races and in their civilizations of which he did not perhaps take
proper account… it seems to be time for the white races… to recognize that, in the changed conditions, the old haughty and dictatorial attitude stands in need of modification. 127 This recognition of alternative civilisations -of the capacity of non-whites -could find expression in admiration and fear alike. Under the specific conditions of anxiety about national decline, and whilst the accomplishments of the Japanese were still believed unique, such recognition of an alternative civilisation manifested itself as a euphoric cult, underpinned by an outlook that relished reciprocal learning. In their quest for national efficiency, the British thus looked towards the Japanese, neither as pseudo-Europeans, an inferior race nor as heathen savages, but rather as the bearers of an advanced yet different civilisation. 
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